By Kevin C. Murphy, Copyright 2013. All Rights Reserved.
America and the World
Progressives and the
Foreign Policy of the 1920s
III. Disarming the World
On December 14th, 1920, six weeks after Harding's election, Borah introduced a resolution urging the President to call a conference of England, Japan, and the United States -- the three major naval powers of the time -- to discuss the prospect of "promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs…shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years." The resolution passed the Senate 54-0, but it went down with the naval bill to which it was attached -- Wilson had opposed Borah's idea, since it included no provision for joining the League.2
Nonetheless, Borah had lit a spark, and -- particularly after the idea of a disarmament conference was seconded by two men with impeccable military credentials, John J, Pershing (on December 29th) and former Army Chief of Staff Tasker Bliss (on January 11th, 1921) -- that spark became a public relations brushfire. By the time Borah reintroduced the resolution on April 13th, 1921, it had, in the words of The Searchlight on Congress, "aroused a public opinion that was irresistible." This time, Borah's resolution passed the Senate 74-0 on May 26th and the House 330-4 on June 29th. Borah, exulted The Searchlight in July, had "won perhaps the greatest legislative victory ever achieved in America. What comes of it must depend on the sincerity and statesmanship of those into whose hands the whole epoch-making matter has now passed. Borah has done his part: He is an outstanding world figure."3
"In my opinion, the beginning of peace is disarmament," Borah explained his gambit to one correspondent. "A world armed to the teeth cannot be other than a fighting world. We do not pauperize ourselves to maintain great armies and we do not build vast navies merely for exhibition. They are built and maintained for the purpose of destruction…In other words, armaments beget not only pauperized communities and nations, but they beget suspicion, jealousy, hate, and finally, war." And since "there is no possible chance to disarm by land so long as the Versailles Treaty is in existence," Borah explained to another, America and the world nevertheless still had the power to "disarm by sea. For there is no one building a navy, or purporting to build a navy, except Great Britain, the United States and Japan. If they see fit to disarm, or to reduce their armaments to a minimum, by sea, it will go a long way toward relieving the human family of the burdens and the crushing militarism fixed upon it by the Versailles Treaty."4
As important for Borah's purposes were the effects disarmament would have on restraining taxes, minimizing debt, and slowing the growth of the federal government. "Our current expenditures for the national government," he explained to one constituent, "are running from $4,500,000,000 to $5,000,000,000 annually. Like a watchman upon his beat, we are hunting now in Congress for something more to tax….How can you reduce taxes unless you reduce expenditures? And how can you reduce expenditures unless you stop paying out money for that which constitutes the bulk of expenditures?" To Borah, "taxes have been the cause of more revolutions and more break-downs in government than any other one thing." "We are being literally demoralized and sterilized in our industrial life by reason of taxes," he told another. "It is practically impossible to secure any relief along this line, except through disarmament. 90% of our taxes go for war, either past or anticipated."5
Just as taxes were destabilizing, a large public debt, Borah thought in true Jeffersonian fashion, was inherently demoralizing. "We now have a public indebtedness upon the part of the national government of about $24,000,000,000," he argued. "Who could calculate the drudgery, the misery, the deprivation, the insanity, the crime and the suicide involved in the struggle for the payment of this sum? There is nothing so onerous, so deadening, so sterilizing, to human energy, so demoralizing to the morale of a people, as an unbearable public debt like this…Ninety-three cents out of every dollar of this sum represents war - wars past or anticipated. Our expenditures for the army and navy annually are equal to the annual reparation obligations of Germany…Only seven cents out of every dollar goes for all other governmental activities."6
That being said, the only way disarmament could possibly happen, Borah thought, is by way of the traditional progressive method of leveraging public opinion. "War scares, based upon secret knowledge, are the common instruments for those who would keep a Nation in a fighting frame of mind," he argued. "Already it has been suggested by high authority that knowledge is within the possession of the Government which makes it very dangerous to consider disarmament." The reduction of arms can only succeed, Borah argued to William Allen White, "through the driving power of public opinion. Governments are inherently against disarmament, the people are unalterably for it."7
Senator Borah was adamant on this point, and it runs through virtually all of his letters on the subject. "The only hope for disarmament," he wrote to one constituent "is in organized public opinion. If the matter is left to a fight with the bureaucrats in Washington, there will be no chance for success." "[G]reat social and moral revolutions, such as the breaking down of the military power and military spirit," he told another, "cannot be accomplished other than through mass movement." "This is the people's fight," he told yet another, "and the people will have to make it." To make any dent in the world's weaponry, he argued to Stanford President David Starr Jordan, "we ought to organize and direct public opinion as we never have before. The subtle influences which are always scheming against things of this kind are active…There are bureaucrats here who expect to wake up any morning and hear the Japanese guns battering away at the Capitol.8
As it happened, an organized army of volunteers was ready to help Borah leverage public opinion for disarmament and against war in the women's movement. Already, Jane Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt had formed the 6000-member Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in 1915 in response to the outbreak of the World War. Now, new pacifist organizations arose from the old suffrage networks to stand alongside WILPF, including the Women's Peace Union, established in 1921 by former suffragists. A "Woman Army against War," announced Fanny Garrison Villard (mother of The Nation editor), "is taking shape a tidal wave of disarmament sentiment…Within a month this supreme women movement has so made itself felt as to frighten out of a reluctant Congress approval of the Borah resolution for a disarmament conference." "Thousands of thinking women," wrote Dora Haines in The Searchlight on Congress of May 1921, "are preparing to play their part in the saving of civilization."9
According to Maud Wood Park, head of the League of Women Voters and Women's Joint Congressional Committee, her members were "'interested in peace almost to the exclusion of any other topic" in the first two years after suffrage. The rank-and-file members of the League and Alice Paul's National Women's Party, soon to break on differing approaches to securing equal rights for women, were as one on this issue. In fact, the most discussed topic at the 1921 LWV convention was disarmament, prompted when Carrie Chapman Catt forewent her prepared remarks on "Psychologies of Political Progress" and delivered instead an impromptu address to "compel action in Washington." "The people in this room tonight," she proclaimed, "were there no others interested in all the world, could put an end to war if they put themselves to it…let us make a resolution, each and every one of us, to consecrate ourselves individually and collectively to the business of putting war out of the world."10
A disarmament resolution brought up at the 1921 NWP convention was ultimately voted down, due to the belief among Party leadership that the organization should remain exclusively dedicated to the issue of women's equality. Nonetheless, it was mostly NWP members, among them Belle La Follette, who gathered to form the Women's Committee for World Disarmament (WCWD), headed by Emma Wold. "We women have the power to compel disarmament," La Follette told a Christmas 1920 open-air meeting of the soon-to-be-formed organization. "We need not plead nor beg. We have the ballot…And here on this day precious to the Christian world, at the very door of the Capitol of our beloved nation, we vow to use our voices to defeat those senators and representatives in Congress who stand for Militarism and War and to elect senators and representatives who stand for Peace and Disarmament."11
Immediately upon its formation, the WCWD worked to make Easter Sunday, March 27th, 1921, Disarmament Day - Borah was the lead speaker at the Washington event -- and planned a Disarmament Week in late May. Working alongside the WILPF and other women's organizations like the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, the WCWD held mass meetings in sixteen states, established chapters in twice as many, and dispatched delegations of women to appeal to the president in person. Alongside the WCWD grew a sister organization in 1921, the National Council on Limitation of Armaments, which eventually became the aforementioned National Council for Prevention of War.12
Looking back on the twenties, Frederick Libby, head of the National Council, argued that at least two-thirds of the peace movement in America had been women. They, argued peace activist Laura Puffer Morgan, "are instinctively more interested than men in humanitarian projects and matters of the common welfare because they have more leisure for study and activity, because they have fewer financial entanglements, and as a result a more objective viewpoint and greater moral courage - in other words, because they are freer." A women's organization, thought Alice Park of the WILPF and NWP, "will be able to do things to forward world peace that perhaps cannot be done in any other way." "It has evidently got to be the women who stop war," argued one member of the Women's Peace Union, "men are too steeped in tradition to brave such a break."13
To some advocates of disarmament, real peace was never possible until women had a full voice in politics. "For centuries men have conducted the governments of the world," Dora Haines wrote in The Searchlight. "The result is a stricken world, war-weakened, with bankruptcy in the background. Civilization itself is threatened. In this crisis women are preparing to take a hand. They have trusted male politicians as long as it can safely be done." To fix this problem, Haines argued, Congress needed more women members immediately. "Congress, man-made and man-minded, while talking disarmament, is proceeding upon the theory that we must be prepared for war. Women believe down deep and through and through…that continued armaments, even without fighting, will break the back and crush the soul of humanity...What women will soon understand, and men apparently cannot…[is that] if our political affairs were conducted openly, honestly, and democratically, no special interest, nor any combination of the beneficiaries of war, could exert their selfish power to profit by plunging the world into war."14
With the fully mobilized force of the former suffragists' organizations behind it, the issue took the nation by storm in 1921. "The question of international disarmament," wrote William Allen White, "is the biggest question before mankind today." Borah -- the Senator, notes historian John Chambers Vinson, who had "lately been the chief opponent of peace through the League" -- was now "the leading advocate in a great crusade to save the nation at once from the peril of war and the pain of taxes…Indeed, [Borah] had wrought something of a miracle. The desire for disarmament and peace, previously resembling a stagnant pool, had been transformed into a rushing river. Soon it was to assume the proportions of a tidal wave as it gained the enthusiastic support of the press, peace societies, churches, civic clubs, and women's organizations all over the nation." Borah, as The Searchlight on Congress put it in November 1921, "has become the great apostle of world peace. He sees the evils of military and commercial imperialism as no one before him has ever visioned their immediate and ultimate consequences to humanity.15
Harding, meanwhile -- who had supported Woodrow Wilson's call to expand the Navy in 1916 and was on record as supporting "the largest navy anyone has cared to suggest," in the words of The Searchlight -- now felt increasing pressure to include disarmament as a cornerstone of normalcy. Al Jolson, who had sung the virtues of Harding on the campaign trail the year before, now proposed to the president that he "start the song of peace thinly coated with ragtime, a-echoing though the land." ("Take away the gun/from every mother's son/We're taught by God above/to Forgive, forget, and love/The weary world is waiting for/Peace, forevermore/So take away the gun/From ev'ry mother's son/and put an end to war.")16
Given this push in both the public and in Congress, Warren Harding had no choice but to accede to the idea of a disarmament conference, and so, for maximum impact, he and Hughes decided to go Borah one farther. On July 11, 1921, the State Department extended invitations to England and Japan, as well as France and Italy, to discuss the issues of naval disarmament and Far East policy in a conference that would begin one day after the third anniversary of the Armistice. Because several other nations had spheres of influence in the East, the nations of China, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal were also invited to send representatives to the convention. Borah was dismayed. "The more nations called in," he had argued to New York World editor Herbert Bayard Swope when proposing his original resolution, "the more the situation will be involved, the more chance for delay and jugglery, and the less opportunity to fix responsibility for delay or for defeat…There is no possible reason for including France or Italy in a Navel disarmament program, for neither one of them has any Navy to cause serious consideration." And the presence of so many of the former World War allies - including those without navies of any account - exacerbated Borah's fears that the disarmament conference would now become yet another "back door" into the League. Other pacifists jested that bringing top-ranking French and English military officers like Ferdinand Foch and Douglas Haig together to discuss disarmament was "like sending butchers to a vegetarian conference."17
Nonetheless, if this assembly of nine nations is where the world was to make its stand on disarmament, Borah thought, it behooved the public to apply maximum pressure there. "[I]t would seem that something in the nature of a propaganda is going out of Washington," Borah argued to the editors of Farm and Home Magazine, "calculated, if not intended, to wholly discourage the people and break down the entire morale of this movement":
The people are being almost daily advised that they must not expect too much from the Conference, that the outlook is discouraging, and that we must not allow our hopes to rise too high…It would seem to me that it would be better to arouse public interest and gear the morale of the cause to the highest pitch, knowing full well that just in proportion that that is done shall we make progress. When the Great War was on, everything, songs, movies, public addresses, proclamations, days of prayer, were utilized to put the public uncompromisingly and enthusiastically behind the cause. Is this movement, which, if effective, means nothing less than the preservation of civilization, less important than the preparation of the indiscriminate destruction of your fellow men?"You can organize all the leagues which the human mind can conceive of and you can establish your international courts," Borah concluded. "But if the world is to be an armed world, it will be a fighting world. Your courts and leagues will disappear under the glare of the first gun that is fired."19
In fact, the Harding administration also thought the moment was right for impressive and decisive action. On Armistice Day, November 11th, 1921, the Unknown Soldier was interred in Arlington Cemetery -- a ceremony which had moved the attending Woodrow Wilson to tears when the crowd had cheered for him once more. "They seek him," Ida Tarbell wrote of the crowd's spontaneous reaction to Wilson that cold morning. "He means something to them; they don't quite know what. He is a living link with their noblest phase." On the next day, President Harding and Secretary of State Hughes furthered the compliment by beginning the first day of the Washington disarmament conference in Wilsonian fashion. This meeting, Harding declared in his opening remarks, is "an earnest of the awakened consciences of twentieth century civilization…a coming together, from all parts of the earth, to apply the better attributes of mankind to minimize the faults of our international relationships."20
"War," the president argued, "has grown progressively cruel and more destructive from the first recorded conflict to this pregnant day, and the reverse order would more become our boasted civilization." Thus, while ensuring the crowd (and the anti-Leaguers of America) that "I do not mean surrendered rights, or narrowed freedom, or denied aspirations, or ignored national necessities," Harding urged the congregated diplomats to "a sober contemplation of the existing order and the realization that there can be no cure without sacrifice, not by one of us but by all of us." Following the president's opening address, Secretary of State Hughes ignited a firestorm when, in his own remarks -- which everyone had assumed would be compromised of similar diplomatic niceties -- he enumerated the exact sacrifices America expected the world to make.21
"We can no longer content ourselves with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with the circumlocution of inquiry," Hughes told the assembled diplomats. "The essential facts are sufficiently known. The time has come, and this Conference has been called, not for general resolutions or mutual advice but for action." And so Hughes proposed "that for a period of not less than ten years there should be no further construction of capital ships." He then prescribed, that America, British, and Japanese ships be maintained at a 5:5:3 ratio respectively. To accomplish this, America proposed to scrap thirty of its own capital ships - half old, half under construction - in return for Britain and Japan sinking nineteen and seventeen of their ships respectively. "Thus, under this plan," concluded the Secretary of State to an audience now shocked awake, "there would be immediately destroyed, of the navies of the three Powers, 66 capital fighting ships, built and building, with a tonnage of 1,878.043."22
The mood in the conference hall after Hughes speech was electric. A "tornado of cheering" ensued, according to one report. The Secretary of State, noted one wag, had just sunk more English ships "than all the admirals of the world had destroyed in a cycle of centuries." Progressive journals, who had waxed cynical about the conference before it had begun, were equally dumbstruck. "Not in modern times has there been so clear and so astounding and so brilliant a feat in statecraft," exclaimed Oswald Villard. "It is good to be an American when conservative American leaders employ methods of open diplomacy and propose reductions in armament which are positively revolutionary," opined The Nation. "If Mr. Hughes' naval holiday does not guarantee peace, it is a long step toward it…[and i]f the public opinion of mankind can win a victory for a naval holiday it may obtain the other conditions of peace." The Secretary of State, applauded The New Republic, "has justified the confidence of his friends and well-wishers by starting the Conference off with a bold and deep plunge into the waters of disarmament…Mr. Hughes' leadership…[has engendered] an atmosphere in which a great and enduring work of public statesmanship can be accomplished." Sensing where the public mood now was on this question, presidential aspirant William McAdoo published an editorial calling Hughes's opening bid "admirable" and arguing further for the complete abolition of navies, "except for such light craft as may be needed for coastal defense purposes….If all nations are without navies, all will be secure from attack by water and the seas will become, as God intended them to be, the great highways of peaceful intercourse between the peoples of the Earth."23
But if progressives were moved by Hughes' grand kickoff to the disarmament conference, they were less pleased when the gathered diplomats got down to brass tacks and old habits began to reemerge. "It is called a conference for the limitation of armaments," wrote Lynn Haines in The Searchlight. "In reality it is more a meeting of world war strategists. No internationally known advocate of peace is there. No woman, pleading for the sanctity and safety of the race, is there. All the greatest and most brilliantly blind of the old-school diplomats are there. Their deliberations are guarded and guided by militarism. The uniform and regalia of the battlefield are everywhere." To Nathaniel Peffer, writing in The Nation, "the farce of the plenary session with all its rodomontade of peace cynically flung in the face of a world haggard with the suffering of one war and the fear of another" had been exposed by the rest of the Conference, with its "jockeying for position and diplomatic Huckstering behind closed doors in the best Foreign Office manner." At the very best, "a maze of detail," wrote Adolf Berle in The Survey, "has overcast the initial splendor of the conference."24
Sure enough, along with securing the naval holiday originally outlined, the Washington Conference also resulted in two agreements that carried a whiff of the old Versailles deal-making - a Four-Power Treaty, among England, Japan, France, and the United States, to consult with each other on matters regarding the Pacific, and a Nine-Power Treaty, among all nations assembled, to preserve the Open Door policy with regard to their respective spheres of influence in China. The usual suspects were livid that the Washington Conference had instead become the site of old world deal-making. "The American people have asked for bread and they have been given a stone," declared Borah of the two ensuing treaties, and American negotiators - who had negotiated the treaties behind closed doors - have "kept the word of promise to the ear and broken it to the heart." To Borah, the Four-Power Treaty was "far more vicious than the League of Nations…It is simply linking us up with the depredators in the Far East." "I am frank to say," he even ventured to one correspondent, "that as between the League of Nations and this Alliance, I would prefer to try the League."25
Pointing to Article II of the Four-Power Treaty, which argued that all four signatories would consult with each other about potential threats in the region, Borah compared it to the iniquitous Article XI of Versailles. It would create a four-power armada in the Pacific, Borah argued, "compared with which the Spanish Armada was an insignificant affair…[T]he practical carrying out of Article 2 [would mean] the assembling of the armed forces of the four great powers of the world." Without further steps taken toward disarmament, Borah argued, "alliances and leagues and understandings and associations of nations organized for the purpose of peace…become a league for war…League covenants, associations, and understandings are construed one way when vast armaments are at hand and another after armaments have been put aside." As for the Nine-Power Treaty, it was "nothing but a naked combination of military powers to dominate the Orient," one that would soon be intent on "underwriting…imperialism in the Pacific." Meanwhile, "the Conference has not touched a single weapon of war with which the next war will be fought if it should come. Submarines, poisonous gas, airbombs, aeroplanes, and so forth, are uncontrolled and unregulated."26
To Senator La Follette, the two treaties -- "hatched in secret" under "the cloak of a conference made possible by a worldwide sentiment for disarmament" -- recalled the alliances that had forced the world into global conflict in 1914. "For the United States," he argued, "to enter into an alliance with the only great imperialist nations which survived the war is a rash substitute for the peaceful, anti-imperialist American policy, tested by a century and a quarter, and based upon friendship with all nations and entangling alliances with none." Looking at the men who had served as American negotiators for the treaties - Hughes, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Oscar Underwood, La Follette argued they had been designed by "representatives of the imperialistic policies of the big banking interests." As it was, the Four-Power Treaty, La Follette concluded, had "all the iniquities of the League of Nations covenant with none of the virtues claimed for that document by its advocates." Hiram Johnson echoed La Follette's evocation of Washington's Farewell Address, as well as his concerns that men like Hughes, a man of "diabolical cunning," had orchestrated the treaties.27
Johnson's reservations were shared by other progressives, including his friend Harold Ickes. "I haven't made a deep study of the proposed four power treaty," Ickes wrote the Senator, "and I confess that my judgment with respect to it is not very clear. On the whole my feeling is one of distrust…Certainly this proposed treaty represents a radical departure from our traditional American policy in international affairs." Ickes found the deal with Japan particularly troubling. "I dislike and mistrust Japan. I wouldn't believe a Japanese diplomat under oath…I think the United States did a shameful thing at Versailles in betraying China on the Shantung issue and, so far as I'm personally concerned, the proof is distinctly upon the proponents of any treaty of alliance between the United States and Japan." In The Nation, Nathaniel Peffer concluded that the Nine-Power Treaty meant "America will not only have suffered an immeasurable defeat in diplomacy; it will have committed a shameful act of betrayal against the Chinese, a people whose cause it had voluntarily sponsored."28
Still, not all progressive-minded observers shared these concerns. "The Four Power Treaty is an imperfect and in some minor respects a dubious arrangement," editorialized The New Republic. But "it builds up an effective, immediate barrier against war without committing the United States to the guaranteeing of doubtful land frontiers or to any egregious offenses against national rights." As for the Nine-Power Pact, TNR thought it "wiser…to accept the Concert as a step in a promising direction and then work for its extension rather than reject it in favor of the adoption of an irreconcilable and non-cooperative policy by the American government." The larger pacifist organizations were inclined to agree. "Agreements looking toward peace will provoke other agreements for peace," S.E. Nicholson of the National Council for Reduction of Armaments wrote to Borah. "The value of the Four-Power Treaty lies in its announced purpose. If it fails and one or more nations violate its terms, the nations are in no worse condition than they were before, but there is a chance that they will not only observe the terms of their agreement, but in doing so will set an example to other nations that is bound to be contagious." At the very least, Adolf Berle argued in The Survey, "when passions run high it will give an opportunity for the quieter voices to be heard, and for excitement to die before killing begins."29
As it was, the treaty passed the Senate 67-27, with Borah, La Follette, Johnson, and Joseph France joining 23 Democrats in opposition. (George Norris voted for passage, to the great dismay of La Follette. "It was a great tug to have him leave us in this fight," the Senator confided to a friend. "It is the first time we have been separated on any important issue since he came to the Senate.") The Women's Committee for World Disarmament, declaring victory after passage of the arms reductions, disbanded.30
Return to the Table of Contents.
2. Ibid. Raymond Leslie Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1922), 147. Lawrence Lenz, Power and Policy: America's First Steps to Superpower, 1889-1922 (New York: Algora, 2008), 226-227.
3. Ibid. "Borah,"The Searchlight on Congress, July 1921 (Volume VI, Number 2), 13.
4. Borah to Hejmert A. Swenson, July 1, 1921. WJB, Box 92: Disarmament - Pennsylvania. Borah to Frank S. Dunshee, June 22, 1921. WJB, Box 87: Versailles Treaty. Although he made it less often, Borah also had a national security argument for disarmament . "I am in favor of a Navy which will make us secure, whatever it costs," he told James T. Williams of the Boston Evening Transcript. "But I want to know that it is a fighting Navy, an efficient Navy, and not a dress-parade Navy. We are building sixteen battleships that will still cost $640,000,000. If you just cut out two of these battleships, we could have eighty submarines, forty on either ocean, which would be infinitely more for a wall for America than the battleships, in my judgment." Borah to James T. Williams, February 1, 1921. WJB, Box 92: Disarmament - MA.
5. Borah to Herbert Myrick, October 5, 1921. WJB. Borah to R.E. Knapp, March 14, 1921. WJB, Box 91: Disarmament - Idaho.
6. Borah to Sunset Magazine, November 2, 1921. WJB, Box 99: Newspapers.
7. Borah to Swenson, July 1, 1921. Borah to William Allen White, July 5, 1921. WJB, Box 98: Misc.
8. Borah to Frank H. Ainworth, March 14, 1921. WJB, Box 90: Disarmament Borah to Edward L. Hardy, November 7, 1921. WJB, Box 90: Disarmament. Borah to Percy Willis, August 29, 191. WJB, Box 91: Disarmament. Borah to David Starr Jordan, October 27, 1921. WJB, Box 91: Disarmament Conference.
9. Fanny Garrison Villard, "The Woman Army Against War," The Searchlight on Congress (Vol. 5, No. 12), 15-17. Dora Haines, "The Challenge of Women to Congress," The Searchlight on Congress (Vol. 5, No. 12), 11.
10. Brown, Setting a Course, 64-66. Cott, 243-245.
11. Cott, 70-71. La Follette, 1029-1030.
12. Brown, Setting a Course, 64-66. Fanny Garrison Villard, "The Woman Army Against War," 15. Cott, 243-245. In one set of correspondence from October 1921, WCWD chairwomen Emma Wold sent Senator Borah a limerick that was going around the movement:
There was a young lady quite charming
Who said 'But this new is alarming.
To spoon is great fun
But it cannot be done
Without arms, and the world is disarming'"
Replied Borah, "The last quotation in your letter rather alarms me. If that idea gets abroad, I fear it will entirely disorganize and demoralize the support of the women." Emma Wold to Borah, October 25, 1921. WJB, Box 91: Disarmament - DC. Borah to Emma Wold, October 26, 1921. WJB, Box 91: Disarmament - DC.
13. Ibid. Harriet Hyman Alonso, The Women's Peace Union and the Outlawry of War, 1921-1942 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 21.
14. Doris Haines, "The Challenge of Women to Congress," The Searchlight on Congress (Vol. 5, No. 12), 11-14.
15. William Allen White to Borah, July 2, 1921. WJB, Box 98: Misc. Vinson, 38. "Borah at the Heights," The Searchlight on Congress, October 1921 (Vol. 6, No. 5), 6.
16. Ashby, 106. Lynn Haines and Henry Raymond Mussey, "Harding's Military Record," The Searchlight on Congress, August 1920 (Vol. 5, No. 3), 19.
17. Buell, 147-148. Borah to Herbert Bayard Swope, December 31, 1920. WJB, Box 112: Four-Power Treaty. Vinson, 42-43. Emma Wold to Borah, October 25, 1921. WJB, Box 91: Disarmament - DC.
18. Borah to Herbert Myrick, October 5, 1921. WJB.
20. Smith, When the Cheering Stopped, 191-194. Conference on the Limitation of Armament (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), 45-46.
21. Ibid, 46-47.
22. Ibid, 62-64. While Hughes delivered his plan, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, Lord David Beatty, looked - according to one reporter - like "a bulldog, sleeping on a sunny doorstep, who had been poked in the stomach by the impudent foot of an itinerate soap-canvasser." Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, 113.
23. Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, 113. Michael Wreszin, Oswald Garrison Villard: Pacifist at War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 172.The Nation, November 23, 1921 (Vol. CXIII, No. 2942), 583. "The Atmosphere of Achievement," The New Republic, November 23, 1921 (Vol. 28, No. 364), 360-362. William McAdoo, "Let Us Abolish Navies," The Searchlight on Congress, November 30, 1921 (Vol. VI, No. 6), 11.
24. Lynn Haines, "The Disarmament Conference," The Searchlight on Congress, November 30, 1921 (Vol. VI, No. 6), 10. Nathaniel Peffer, "Jockeying at Washington," The Nation, December 21, 1921 (Vol. 113, No. 2946), 724. Adolf Berle, "Bread and Guns," The Survey, February 4 1922, 723.
25. Johnson, Peace Progressives, 168-169. Borah to Elizabeth Black, December 15, 1921. WJB, Box 112: Four-Power Treaty. Borah to H.A. Lawson, December 19, 1921. WJB, Box 112: Four-Power Treaty. Borah to John N. Harman, January 2, 1922. WJB, Box 112: Four-Power Treaty. Borah to H.L. Schneider, January 3, 1922. WJB, Box 112: Four-Power Treaty.
26. "Debating the Pacific Pact," The Searchlight on Congress, December 31, 1921 (Vol. VI, No. 7), 12-13. Johnson, Peace Progressives, 169. Borah to Hugh MacCallum, December 16, 1921. WJB, Box 112: Four-Power Treaty. Borah to Mrs. J.C. Saltzman, December 13, 1921. WJB, Box 112: Four-Power Treaty.
27. "Debating the Pacific Pact," The Searchlight on Congress, 13. Johnson, Peace Progressives, 169. La Follette, 1037.
28. Ickes to Johnson, March 7, 1922. HLI Box 33: Hiram Johnson. Nathaniel Peffer, "Jockeying in Washington," The Nation, 725.
29. "American Obligations under the Treaty," The New Republic, December 28, 1921 (Vol. 39, No. 369), 113-114. S.E. Nicholson to Borah, March 20, 1922. WJB, Box 112: Four-Power Treaty. Adolf Berle, "Bread and Guns," The Survey, February 11, 1922, 754-756.
30. La Follette, 1037-1038. Cott, 246.
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